Technological Determinism and Its Discontents by Yoo, Christopher S.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2014 
Technological Determinism and Its Discontents 
Christopher S. Yoo 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Communications 
Law Commons, Digital Communications and Networking Commons, Internet Law Commons, Law and 
Economics Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Political Economy Commons, 
Science and Technology Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Policy Commons 
Repository Citation 
Yoo, Christopher S., "Technological Determinism and Its Discontents" (2014). Faculty Scholarship at Penn 
Law. 1542. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1542 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
  
914 
BOOK REVIEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM  
AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY 
POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE.  By Susan Crawford.  New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press.  2013.  Pp. 360.  $30.00. 
Reviewed by Christopher S. Yoo∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
During the period after the Internet first emerged as a mass-market 
phenomenon, it was almost always discussed in laudatory terms.  The 
shift in focus from manufacturing to technology-oriented industries 
was creating a “new economy” characterized by higher growth rates 
than previously thought possible.1  The Internet provided additional 
opportunities to create value by enabling companies to reach consum-
ers whose numbers were previously thought to be too small to be 
served.2  At the same time, many praised the Internet for providing 
better access to information and empowering individuals.3  The Su-
preme Court joined the chorus in Reno v. ACLU,4 lauding the Internet 
as “a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communi-
cation”5 that took “content . . . as diverse as human thought”6 and 
made it “available to anyone, anywhere in the world.”7  Adopting a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ John H. Chestnut Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information Science, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School.   The title is obviously modeled on SIGMUND FREUD, 
CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James Strachey ed. & trans., W.W. Norton 1961) (1930). 
 1 For the seminal use of the phrase, see Charles P. Alexander et al., The New Economy, 
TIME, May 30, 1983, at 70.  References to the new economy became so entrenched that the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers devoted its entire 2001 Annual Report to exploring the underpinnings 
and implications of this shift.  Council of Econ. Advisers, The Annual Report of the Council of 
Economic Advisers, in ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 7 (2001), available at http:// 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ERP-2001/pdf/ERP-2001.pdf. 
 2 See, e.g., Erik Brynjolfsson et al., Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the 
Value of Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers, 49 MGMT. SCI. 1580, 1581 (2003). 
 3 See, e.g., NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 153–54 (1995). 
 4 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 5 Id. at 850 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 6 Id. at 852 (quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 7 Id. at 851. 
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mode of reasoning appropriately called technological determinism,8 
many early commentators argued that technology is a force of nature 
that can be neither stopped9 nor controlled.10 
More recent commentary has continued to exhibit technological de-
terminism, albeit with a more pessimistic attitude.  These critics can be 
organized into two camps.11  One warns that technology possesses a 
potential dark side, agonizing over the danger that the Internet may be 
shortening our attention span,12 crowding out cultural masterworks,13 
weakening democracy,14 and undermining our humanity.15  Another 
group retains the belief that technology can improve the human condi-
tion, while worrying that corporate interests may prevent the Internet 
from realizing its potential unless the government intervenes.16 
Professor Susan Crawford’s book, Captive Audience, adopts the se-
cond approach, viewed through the lens of the recent merger between 
Comcast and NBC Universal.  As an initial matter, Crawford is sharp-
ly critical of U.S. broadband Internet access, which she considers too 
expensive and unavailable in many parts of the country (pp. 3, 185–
86).  In addition, Crawford worries that the market for broadband ac-
cess is becoming increasingly monopolistic, because cable-modem ser-
vice is in the best position to provide the 100 megabytes per second 
(Mbps) or 1 gigabyte per second (Gbps) service needed for high-
definition video (pp. 2, 64, 113, 172, 263–64).  Although cable-modem 
service once faced competition from telephone companies offering digi-
tal subscriber line (DSL) service (p. 53), she argues that DSL has be-
come obsolete (pp. 64, 161, 225, 251, 259).  Fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) 
services such as Verizon FiOS can compete effectively with cable, but 
the two companies that could have an effect in this field, AT&T and 
Verizon, have not made this competition a reality: AT&T never pur-
sued FTTH, and Verizon has stopped expanding its FiOS network 
(pp. 3, 8, 78, 80, 113, 236).  Instead, AT&T and Verizon have focused 
on wireless broadband (pp. 10, 161, 237), which lacks the bandwidth 
to compete effectively with cable (pp. 9, 64, 79, 121, 160–61, 234–35, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 Adam Thierer, The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 1: Saving the Net from Its Detractors, 
in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE 57, 63 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010). 
 9 See, e.g., NEGROPONTE, supra note 3, at 229–31. 
 10 See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRON-
IC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
 11 See Thierer, supra note 8, at 57–58. 
 12 See, e.g., NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS 5–10 (2010). 
 13 See, e.g., ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR 27–34 (2007). 
 14 See, e.g., LEE SIEGEL, AGAINST THE MACHINE 125–37, 165 (2008). 
 15 See, e.g., JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET 3–5 (Vintage Books 2011) (2010). 
 16 See, e.g., BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE 317–57 (2012); LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 262–65 (2001); BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE 
AND INNOVATION 10 (2010); TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH 299–319 (2010); JONATHAN  
ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET — AND HOW TO STOP IT 3–5 (2008). 
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251).  Wireless service is thus more properly regarded as a complement 
rather than a competitor to cable service (pp. 9, 53, 64, 117, 156–157, 
160, 251).  Crawford concedes that these problems predated the merger 
and would exist regardless of whether the merger was blocked or per-
mitted to proceed (p. 230). 
A concern more closely rooted to the merger is that placing Com-
cast’s network services and NBC Universal’s cable networks under 
the same corporate umbrella will allow the combined entity to stifle 
emerging online video distributors (OVDs), such as Netflix.  The com-
bination of Comcast’s supposed monopoly over high-speed Internet (p. 
2) with key programming properties controlled by NBC Universal (pp. 
132–33) will purportedly allow the merged company to restrict OVDs’ 
access both to last-mile connectivity17 (pp. 121, 175–85) and to must-
have content (pp. 114–20, 174).  To Crawford, this outcome seems in-
evitable.  Crawford devotes a chapter to the proposed AT&T and T-
Mobile merger, complaining that even though the government blocked 
the merger, Verizon and AT&T would remain an effective duopoly and 
would be unlikely to lower prices or improve services any time soon 
(pp. 235, 251–52).  She concludes that the best way to promote faster, 
cheaper, symmetrical, reliable Internet access would be for the gov-
ernment to subsidize municipal FTTH and turn the Internet into a 
public utility by bringing back common carriage (pp. 254–58, 264–66). 
A brief look at the history of this sector underscores that any such 
technologically deterministic predictions should be approached with ex-
treme caution.  There is good reason to question whether DSL and 
wireless broadband can no longer compete with cable-modem service.  
Moreover, previous firms that have attempted to restrict access to ap-
plications and content have met with dismal results.  Early dial-up ac-
cess providers, such as CompuServe and Prodigy, pursued this strategy, 
only to see it fail.18  Complaints similar to those raised by Crawford 
were lodged against Excite@Home,19 a cable company–owned Internet 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 Last-mile networks are those which control the last mile of cable before reaching consum-
ers’ homes.  Thus, even if OVDs transmitted their content over different networks, because Com-
cast controls access to the end consumers, any traffic to Comcast’s end users would pass through 
its network (pp. 168, 182–85). 
 18 See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1847, 1849 (2006). 
 19 See, e.g., Written Ex Parte of Professor Mark A. Lemley and Professor Lawrence Lessig, 
Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations 
from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, 15 FCC Rcd. 9816 (2000) 
(No. 99-251), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=6009850927; Mark A. Lemley 
& Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the 
Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 928–29, 932–33 (2001); Lawrence B. Solum & Minn 
Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 
936–37 (2004). 
  
2014] TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 917 
service provider (ISP) that spectacularly fell into bankruptcy in 2001.20  
Commentators also objected to the integration of video programming 
and distribution when News Corp. acquired DirecTV in 2003,21 only 
to see News Corp. reverse the transaction five short years later.22  
More recently, Time Warner abandoned precisely the strategy that 
Comcast–NBC Universal is supposedly pursuing when it separated its 
programming properties from its cable network by spinning off Time 
Warner Cable.23  And perhaps most notoriously, commentators pro-
tested the combination of content and conduit during America 
Online’s 2001 acquisition of Time Warner,24 only to see the combina-
tion dissolve in 2009 at a loss of approximately $200 billion.25 
Past failed attempts to combine content and conduit serve as a cau-
tionary note regarding anyone’s ability to forecast which business 
strategies will prove successful and instead counsel in favor of hesitat-
ing before basing prescriptive regulatory policies on any such predic-
tions.  As the long litany of failed Internet businesses demonstrates, 
ownership of value-creating technologies is not sufficient to guarantee 
commercial success, putting the lie to the oft-quoted mantra, “If you 
build it, they will come.”26  Timing matters, as does the development 
of complementary technologies and the manner in which technologies 
are implemented.  Instead, history counsels in favor of remaining 
open-minded about new practices and preserving innovators’ ability to 
experiment with alternative ways of doing business.  Moreover, poli-
cymakers must keep in mind that the law of unintended consequences 
means that regulatory interventions can often be counterproductive in 
surprising ways.  The fact that such change is disruptive and inevita-
bly creates winners and losers, however, should not deter policymakers 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 See Ben Heskett & Rachel Konrad, Excite@Home Files for Bankruptcy, CNET NEWS 
(Oct. 1, 2001, 7:50 AM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1033-273689.html. 
 21 See General Motors Corp. and Hughes Electronics Corp., Transferors, and the News Corp. 
Ltd., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 473, 476–77 ¶ 4 (2004). 
 22 News Corp. and the DirecTV Group, Inc., Transferors, and Liberty Media Corp., Transfer-
ee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 3265, 3266 (2008). 
 23 Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses, Time 
Warner Inc., and Its Subsidiaries, Assignor/Transferor, to Time Warner Cable Inc., and Its Sub-
sidiaries, Assignee/Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 FCC Rcd. 879 (2009). 
 24 See, e.g., Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, Open Access to Broadband Networks: A Case 
Study of the AOL/Time Warner Merger, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 631 (2001). 
 25 Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI.  
LEGAL F. 179, 258; Press Release, Time Warner, Time Warner Inc. Completes Spin-Off  
of AOL Inc. (Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item 
=UGFyZW50SUQ9MjMzODh8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1. 
 26 This line is a common misquotation of the line made famous by the movie FIELD OF 
DREAMS (Universal Pictures 1989).  The proper quotation is, “If you build it, he will come.”  See 
Keertana Sastry, 15 Famous Movie Quotes Everyone Gets Wrong, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 10, 2012, 
10:52 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/common-movie-misquotes-2012-5?op=1. 
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from rejecting technological determinism and keeping a watchful eye 
as events unfold. 
Part I of this Book Review examines Crawford’s claim that cable-
modem service will soon emerge as the dominant platform for broad-
band Internet access.  Part II critiques her arguments that vertical inte-
gration of Comcast’s distribution infrastructure with NBC Universal’s 
programming properties will harm consumers.  Part III explores the  
potential unintended consequences of regulatory intervention.  Part IV 
assesses Crawford’s recommendations in favor of municipal fiber and 
common carriage. 
I.  THE LOOMING CABLE MONOPOLY 
One of the book’s most recurrent tropes is its warning about the 
“looming cable monopoly” over high-speed Internet service (p. 17).27  
Even though cable-modem service providers capture only one-third of 
broadband subscribers in their service areas, Crawford predicts that 
two dynamics will soon allow cable companies to control somewhere 
between 70% and 90% of the market (pp. 53, 65, 172), which will be 
dominated by two companies: Comcast and, to a lesser degree, Time 
Warner Cable (p. 235).  The first is the demise of traditional fixed-line 
telephone companies as broadband competitors.  The second is wire-
less broadband’s inability to provide sufficient bandwidth to support 
video programming.  The one technology that Crawford thinks can 
compete with cable is FTTH, which I will discuss below.28 
A.  Cable vs. DSL 
As Crawford acknowledges, asymmetric DSL (ADSL) and cable-
modem service once competed vigorously (p. 53).  Early ADSL typical-
ly offered download speeds of 1.5 Mbps (with a theoretical maximum 
of 10 Mbps) at a cost of $600 to $800 per subscriber.29  This was com-
parable to cable-modem service under the initial DOCSIS 1.0 stand-
ard, which typically offered download speeds of 3 Mbps at a cost of 
$800 to $1000 per subscriber.30 
Each technology was subject to a number of technological con-
straints.  Telephone companies could provide ADSL only to customers 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 For similar references, see pp. 1, 53, 60, 64, 79, 85, 113, 251. 
 28 See infra section IV.A, pp. 945–48. 
 29 Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All 
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deploy-
ment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report, 14 FCC Rcd. 2398, 
2431 chart 2, app. A at 2455 (1999) [hereinafter First Broadband Progress Report]. 
 30 Id. at 2431 chart 2, app. A at 2456–57.  
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located within 18,000 feet of a central office or a fiber node.31  ADSL, 
moreover, was not a fully Internet-based service; some ADSL provid-
ers utilized a legacy circuit-based technology known as asynchronous 
transfer mode (ATM) to route data transmissions internally.32  Because 
cable-modem service shares bandwidth locally, effective quality of ser-
vice depended on the current usage of immediate neighbors, which 
made the quality of cable-modem service quite variable.33 
In 2006, a new standard known as DOCSIS 3.0 enabled cable-
modem providers to offer download speeds of 160 Mbps or faster.34  
The industry reports that DOCSIS 3.0 is now available in 85% of U.S. 
households.35  The higher speeds made possible by DOCSIS 3.0 ren-
dered DSL obsolete (p. 161).  Newer versions of DSL, such as AT&T’s 
U-verse network, deploy additional fiber nodes to shorten the distance 
between the node and the end user to two to four thousand feet,36 
which increases download speeds to up to 24 Mbps.37  Crawford dis-
counts U-verse as a competitor because AT&T had stopped its U-verse 
buildout at 40–45% percent of its footprint and because fiber to the 
node does not provide sufficient bandwidth to compete with DOCSIS 
3.0 (p. 236).  Indeed, the bandwidth limitations are so severe that 
Crawford suggests telephone companies are in the process of abandon-
ing DSL altogether (pp. 161, 259). 
Recent history suggests that predictions of DSL’s demise may have 
been premature.  On November 7, 2012, AT&T announced Project Ve-
locity IP, which included $6 billion to upgrade its DSL network.38  
Specifically, AT&T plans to expand its U-verse network to approxi-
mately 8.5 million additional customer locations by the end of 2015, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 Id. at app. A at 2456; Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the 
New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 255 (2002). 
 32 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Re-
port and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,860 n.15 (2005). 
 33 See First Broadband Progress Report, supra note 29, at 2457. 
 34 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All 
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deploy-
ment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Fifth Report, 23 FCC Rcd. 
9615, 9619 ¶ 9 (2008).  The 150 Mbps download speed is based on the assumption that firms de-
ploying DOCSIS 3.0 only bond the minimum number of four channels.  See id. at 9619 n.21.  
Bonding more channels together should allow DOCSIS 3.0 to deliver speeds in the multiple–
gigabyte per second range.  See Dale N. Hatfield, The Challenge of Increasing Broadband Capaci-
ty, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 53–54 (2010). 
 35 Industry Data: Cable HSI DOCSIS 3 Service Availability, NAT’L CABLE & TELECOMM. 
ASS’N, http://www.ncta.com/industry-data (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
 36 See Yoo, supra note 25, at 201. 
 37 AT&T U-verse High Speed Internet, AT&T, http://www.att.com/u-verse/explore/internet 
-landing.jsp (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
 38 See Press Release, AT&T, AT&T to Invest $14 Billion to Significantly Expand Wireless and 
Wireline Broadband Networks, Support Future IP Data Growth and New Services (Nov. 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=23506&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=35661. 
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increasing its coverage to 33 million consumer and small business loca-
tions.39  This will extend U-verse from 32% to 43% of the households 
in AT&T’s service area.40  AT&T will deploy technologies known as 
pair bonding and vectoring to increase speeds still further.41  AT&T 
predicts that 90% of U-verse households will receive download speeds 
of 75 Mbps, and 75% will receive downloads speeds of 100 Mbps.42 
Furthermore, for an additional 24 million households (or an addi-
tional 32% of AT&T’s footprint), AT&T plans to upgrade its current 
ADSL network by replacing conventional DSL Access Multiplexers 
(DSLAMs), which route data traffic internally using ATM, with new 
IP DSLAMs, which route traffic internally using the Internet Proto-
col.43  Nearly 80% of IP DSLAM customers will receive download 
speeds of 45 Mbps, and half of those customers will receive download 
speeds of 75 Mbps.44  Together, these two expansions will cover 75% 
of the customer locations in AT&T’s service area.45  Thus, contrary to 
Crawford’s prediction, AT&T is expanding its U-verse offerings and 
increasing its speeds. 
This is not the first time commentators have prematurely attempted 
to write off DSL.  In November 1999, Professors Mark Lemley and 
Lawrence Lessig noted that cable held an 80% to 20% lead over DSL 
and predicted that ADSL was unlikely to narrow the gap quickly.46  
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) saw the situation 
differently in August 2000, predicting that ADSL would emerge as a 
competitor to cable-modem service.47  The D.C. Circuit also noted that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 Id. 
 40 Alan Weissberger, AT&T to Expand U-verse & IP-DSLAM; Bring Fiber to Commercial 
Buildings & Cover 99% of US with LTE!, VIODI VIEW (Nov. 8, 2012), http://viodi.com/2012/11 
/08/at-bring-fiber-to-commercial-buildings-cover-99-of-us-with-lte. 
 41 Kamalini Ganguly, AT&T Expands U-verse, Moves Closer to Integrated All-IP Network, 
Services, OVUM (Nov. 13, 2012), http://ovum.com/2012/11/13/att-expands-u-verse-moves-closer-to 
-integrated-all-ip-network-services. 
 42 Karl Bode, Details on Rumored New AT&T U-verse Speeds, DSL REPORTS (Mar. 21, 2013, 
12:22 PM), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/Details-on-Rumored-New-ATT-UVerse-Speeds 
-123593 (citing statement from AT&T CEO John Donovan). 
 43 See Press Release, AT&T, supra note 38 (stating that AT&T plans to provide 24 million cus-
tomer locations with high-speed IP Internet access). 
 44 Bode, supra note 42.  AT&T announced the deployment of 45 Mbps service in forty markets 
across fifteen states.  Press Release, AT&T, 45 Mbps U-verse Internet Service Arrives in 40 Addi-
tional Markets (Aug. 26, 2013), available at http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=24734&cdvn 
=news&newsarticleid=36934. 
 45 See Press Release, AT&T, supra note 38. 
 46 See Written Ex Parte of Professor Mark A. Lemley and Professor Lawrence Lessig, supra 
note 19, at 30 ¶ 81; see also Lemley & Lessig, supra note 19, at 952 (stating that, as of 2000, ca-
ble’s market share in the residential broadband market was 70%). 
 47 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All 
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deploy-
ment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Report, 15 FCC 
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ADSL had emerged as a robust competitor to cable-modem service.48  
History would vindicate the FCC and the D.C. Circuit.  ADSL had 
narrowed the ratio of cable-modem service to ADSL lines from 65% to 
35% by the end of 200049 and would narrow the gap still further to 55% 
to 45% by 2007.50  Since that time, ADSL has declined relative to cable-
modem service, but has maintained a roughly 60% to 40% split.51 
Crawford nonetheless asserts that subscribers require between 50 
Mbps and 100 Mbps for video (pp. 2, 60).52  DSL cannot compete with 
cable-modem service because it relies on last-mile communications 
over copper wires that cannot deliver the necessary speeds (p. 236).  
Indeed, Crawford predicts that end users will soon need gigabit service 
(pp. 2, 263–64). 
The data collected by the federal government fails to bear this out.  
As of September 2012, the average subscribed speed was only 15.6 
Mbps,53 despite the widespread availability of faster speeds.54  More-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Rcd. 20,913, 20,985 ¶ 189, 20,986 ¶ 191, 20,988 ¶ 196 (2000) (predicting that DSL would capture 
13 million subscribers by 2004 versus 15.2 million subscribers to cable-modem service). 
 48 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428–29 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Inquiry Con-
cerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Rea-
sonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Sec-
tion 706 of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report, 17 FCC Rcd. 2844, 2864 ¶ 44, 2865 
¶ 48 (2002); First Broadband Progress Report, supra note 29, at 2423 ¶ 48). 
 49 See INDUS. ANALYSIS DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR 
INTERNET ACCESS: SUBSCRIBERSHIP AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2000, at 6 tbl.1 (2001), available 
at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/hspd0801.pdf. 
 50 See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, HIGH-SPEED SER-
VICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2007, at 6 tbl.1 (2009), available 
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-287962A1.pdf. 
 51 See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS 
SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2012, at 23 tbl.5 (2013) [hereinafter JUNE 2012 INTERNET 
ACCESS SERVICES REPORT], available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch 
/DOC-321076A1.pdf. 
 52 Crawford also argues that broadband service should be symmetrical (pp. 2, 12, 262–64).  
Symmetrical allocation of bandwidth would make sense if end users upload as frequently as they 
download, typically associated with peer-to-peer traffic.  This claim is undercut by the fact that 
peer-to-peer traffic has plummeted from a high of over 65% of consumer Internet traffic in 2005 
to below 20% in 2013 and is projected to fall still further in years to come.  CHRISTOPHER S. 
YOO, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET 30–31 (2012) [hereinafter YOO, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET].  
Although Crawford attempts to justify her call for symmetrical bandwidth based on the needs of 
businesses (pp. 12, 264), connecting businesses typically requires only laying fiber to a handful of 
locations, which can be accomplished without incurring the substantial expense of laying fiber 
networks in residential neighborhoods.  Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architec-
ture that Challenge the Status Quo, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 96 (2010) [here-
inafter Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture]. 
 53 OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH. & CONSUMER & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS BUREAU, FED. 
COMMC’NS COMM’N, 2013 MEASURING BROADBAND AMERICA: A REPORT ON CONSUMER 
WIRELINE BROADBAND PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. 6 (2013), available at http://transition.fcc 
.gov/cgb/measuringbroadbandreport/2013/Measuring-Broadband-America-feb-2013.pdf. 
 54 NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN. & FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, BROADBAND STA-
TISTICS REPORT: ACCESS TO BROADBAND TECHNOLOGY BY SPEED 4 (2013), available at  
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over, as of June 2012, where download speeds of 100 Mbps or more 
were available, only 0.12% of households subscribed to service of that 
speed.55  Where download speeds of 25 Mbps or more were available, 
only 10.75% of households subscribed.56  Adoption rates for 100 Mbps 
service in countries that Crawford views as models for broadband pol-
icy are similarly disappointing.57  Thus, the vast majority of customers 
with the opportunity to purchase faster service decline to do so.  In-
deed, Crawford concedes as much when she observes that consumers 
are only now beginning to purchase higher tiers (p. 182). 
In short, telephone companies have been able to wring more band-
width out of the twisted pair of copper telephone lines than anyone 
could have imagined.  Whether the 45 Mbps to 100 Mbps service that 
AT&T is able to provide via DSL is sufficient to compete with cable 
remains to be seen. 
B.  Cable vs. Wireless Broadband 
As noted above, Crawford’s argument that cable companies will 
monopolize Internet access also depends on her assertion that wireless 
broadband lacks the bandwidth to serve as a substitute for cable (pp. 
9, 64, 79, 121, 160–61, 234–35, 251).  Wireless service is instead more 
properly regarded as a complement rather than a competitor to cable 
service (pp. 9, 53, 64, 117, 156, 157, 160, 251).  This claim is quite 
striking, because wireless broadband represents one of the most suc-
cessful recent developments in the broadband market.  Measured  
at the lowest-speed tier, as of June 2012 mobile wireless broadband 
had captured 153 million subscribers, more than triple the number of 
cable-modem subscribers.58  Moreover, mobile wireless broadband 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
h t t p : / / w w w 2 . n t i a . d o c . g o v / f i l e s / b r o a d b a n d - d a t a / T e c h n o l o g y % 2 0 b y % 2 0 S p e e d % 2 0 J U N % 2 0 2 0 1 2 . p d f 
(reporting that 78% of households had access to 25 Mbps service as of June 2012). 
 55 Specifically, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) 
study indicates that 100 Mbps service was available in 46.37% of 136,714,122 household units, 
which equals 63.4 million households.  Id.  Only 74,000 households subscribed to 100 Mbps, 
which equals 0.12% of households with access to it.  JUNE 2012 INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES 
REPORT, supra note 51, at 31 tbl.11.  Even if one considers all subscribers to 100 Mbps service 
and not just residential subscribers, 156,000 subscriptions still equals a minuscule take-up rate of 
0.25%.  Id. at 30 tbl.10. 
 56 The NTIA study indicates that 25 Mbps service was available in 77.57% of 136,714,122 
household units, which equals 106.0 million households.  NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN. 
& FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 54, at 4.  Only 11,324,000 households subscribed to 25 
Mbps service, which equals 10.68% of households with access to it.  JUNE 2012 INTERNET AC-
CESS SERVICES REPORT, supra note 51, at 31 tbl.11. 
 57 In Europe, take-up rate for 100 Mbps service is one line per 100 inhabitants, which trans-
lates to roughly 2% of households.  Commission Staff Working Document: Digital Agenda Score-
board 2013, at 56, SWD (2013) 217 final (June 12, 2013), available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital 
- a g e n d a / s i t e s / d i g i t a l - a g e n d a / f i l e s / D A E % 2 0 S C O R E B O A R D % 2 0 2 0 1 3 % 2 0 - % 2 0 S W D % 2 0 2 0 1 3 
%20217%20FINAL.pdf. 
 58 See JUNE 2012 INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES REPORT, supra note 51, at 1, 23 tbl.5. 
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subscribers increased by 28% over the preceding twelve-month period, 
as compared with the more modest 6% growth rate for cable modem.59 
Most of the subscribers in the June 2012 data reportedly subscribed 
to third-generation (3G) wireless technologies, which provide some-
what limited bandwidth.  The ongoing deployment of the fourth-
generation (4G) wireless technology known as Long Term Evolution 
(LTE) promises to make mobile broadband an even more effective 
competitor to cable-modem service.  Although Verizon’s LTE service 
advertises peak download speeds of 25 Mbps and average speeds of 12 
Mbps, Crawford expresses doubts as to whether Verizon can actually 
deliver on those promises (p. 251).  She need not have worried.  Inde-
pendent news reports indicate that AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile are 
delivering peak download speeds of between 49 and 66 Mbps and av-
erage download speeds of between 12 and 19 Mbps.60  Sprint advertis-
es and delivers slower rates for its LTE service.61 
Moreover, mobile broadband providers’ expansion plans are ex-
tremely aggressive.  Verizon began its LTE deployment in December 
2010 and covered its entire 3G footprint with LTE by mid-2013,62 
serving 300 million people or 96% of the U.S. population.63  AT&T, 
which launched LTE in September 2011,64 plans to reach 80% of the 
U.S. population by the end of 2013 and to complete the build-out of its 
entire network by the end of 2014, at which point it should reach 96% 
of the U.S. population.65  Sprint launched LTE in July 2012 and fore-
casts reaching 200 million people by the end of 2013.66  T-Mobile be-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 See id. at 1, 23 tbl.5. 
 60 See Patrick Linder, Lightning-Fast Data Speeds and Expanding Coverage: A 4G LTE Per-
formance Review, ROOT METRICS (Mar. 11, 2003), http://www.rootmetrics.com/special-reports 
/lte-performance-review [hereinafter Root Metrics Study] (reporting peak and average download 
speeds of 57.7 Mbps and 18.6 Mbps for AT&T LTE and 49.3 Mbps and 14.3 Mbps for Verizon 
LTE); Sascha Segan, Fastest Mobile Networks 2013, PC MAG. (June 17, 2013), http://www.pcmag 
.com/article2/0,2817,2420334,00.asp (reporting peak and average download speeds of 66.11 Mbps 
and 16.65 Mbps for AT&T LTE, 62.03 Mbps and 12.07 Mbps for T-Mobile LTE, and 59.83 Mbps 
and 11.93 Mbps for Verizon LTE). 
 61 See Root Metrics Study, supra note 60 (reporting peak and average download speeds of 32.7 
Mbps and 10.3 Mbps for Sprint LTE); Segan, supra note 60 (reporting peak and average down-
load speeds of 32.32 Mbps and 5.55 Mbps for Sprint LTE). 
 62 Andy Patrizio, Verizon’s LTE Coverage Will Match 3G Coverage by Mid-2013, BRIGHT-
HAND (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.brighthand.com/default.asp?newsID=19521. 
 63 Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Six-
teenth Report, 28 FCC Rcd. 3700, 3727 n.51, 3745 tbl.3 (2013) [hereinafter Sixteenth Annual Mo-
bile Wireless Competition Report]. 
 64 Id. at 3775 ¶ 96. 
 65 Id. at 3707. 
 66 Phil Goldstein, Sprint Loses 337,000 Net Subs, Lowers LTE Coverage Goal to 200M by Year-
End, FIERCE WIRELESS (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/sprint-loses-337000 
-net-subs-lowers-lte-coverage-goal-200m-year-end/2013-02-07. 
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gan deploying LTE in March 201367 and forecasts reaching 200 million 
people by the end of the year.68  Smaller providers, such as Leap, U.S. 
Cellular, and C-Spire, are also deploying LTE.69 
Crawford nonetheless maintains that wireless broadband cannot 
compete with cable modem because subscribers will need between 50 
Mbps and 100 Mbps for video (pp. 2, 60, 174).  It is far from clear that 
video requires that much bandwidth.  Skype recommends 1.5 Mbps 
for HD video calling and 2–8 Mbps for group video, depending on the 
number of people involved.70  Netflix recommends 7 Mbps for Super 
HD and 12 Mbps for 3D.71  Given video’s relatively modest demand 
for bandwidth, it comes as no surprise that the vast majority of Amer-
icans do not purchase such speeds when they are available.72 
It is thus plausible that wireless broadband can deliver the broad-
band speeds that consumers actually demand.  Calls for ever-faster 
service risk running afoul of what Professor Clayton Christensen 
called the “innovator’s dilemma,” which provides an explanation for 
why market-leading firms that pioneer new technologies are often dis-
placed by later arriving firms that are less sophisticated.73  The inno-
vating firms become preoccupied with pursuing the cutting edge of 
technology and produce products that exceed what consumers actually 
need.  This in turn creates an opening for new products that are tech-
nologically inferior but more in line with what consumers actually 
want.74  In contrast to Schumpeterian gales of creative destruction, 
Christensen’s disruptive innovation does not arise from better technol-
ogy, but from better business models.75  Rather than becoming caught 
up in a technophile’s affinity for the cutting edge, broadband providers 
should focus on what consumers actually need. 
As the National Broadband Plan notes, whether wireless broad-
band can serve as an effective competitor to cable thus depends on 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 Phil Goldstein, T-Mobile to Launch LTE in March, Updates Galaxy Note II for LTE, FIERCE 
WIRELESS (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/t-mobile-launch-lte-march-updates 
-galaxy-note-ii-lte/2013-03-18. 
 68 Sixteenth Annual Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 63, at 3707. 
 69 Id. 
 70 How Much Bandwidth Does Skype Need?, SKYPE, https://support.skype.com/en/faq/FA1417 
/how-much-bandwidth-does-skype-need (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
 71 Internet Connection Speed Recommendations, NETFLIX, https://support.netflix.com/en 
/node/306 (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
 72 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
 73 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, at xv (1997).   
 74 Id. at 165. 
 75 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., SEEING WHAT’S NEXT: USING THE THEORIES 
OF INNOVATION TO PREDICT INDUSTRY CHANGE 16 (2004); see also Raphael Amit & 
Christoph Zott, Creating Value Through Business Model Innovation, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., 
Spring 2012, at 41; Mark W. Johnson et al., Reinventing Your Business Model, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Dec. 2008, at 50, 52. 
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how quickly the demand for wireless bandwidth develops.76  Press re-
ports indicate that some people are beginning to drop their fixed-line 
broadband connection and rely entirely on their wireless device for 
their broadband capability.77  A survey conducted by the British Office 
of Communications (Ofcom) revealed that 6% of U.S. households re-
lied entirely on mobile broadband for their Internet connectivity as of 
October 2011.78  A 2011 Cisco study estimates that 15% of customers 
may drop wireline broadband in favor of wireless.79  The Dish Net-
work based its failed bid for Sprint in part on the belief that as  
many as one third of Americans may prefer to rely exclusively on wire-
less broadband.80  Moreover, in May 2012, Verizon began offering a 
HomeFusion service, which uses LTE to provide fixed wireless broad-
band to homes.81  A phone survey conducted in late 2012 indicated 
that 8% of all U.S. adults and 10% of adult Internet users rely exclu-
sively on their smartphones for their Internet connectivity.82 
By the time that consumers begin to demand such higher speeds, 
LTE could well be able to meet that demand.  Some operators, such as 
the United Kingdom’s leading wireless provider, EE (formerly known 
as Everything Everywhere), have assembled sufficient contiguous 
spectrum to offer LTE service with download speeds of 150 Mbps.83  
The International Telecommunications Union has also issued stand-
ards for the next generation of wireless communications, known as 
LTE Advanced, which is theoretically capable of providing download 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 76 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND 
PLAN 40–42 (2010) [hereinafter NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN], available at http://download 
.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf. 
 77 Anton Troianovski, People Are Cutting the Cord — For Web More than TV, WALL ST. J., 
May 30, 2013, at B1. 
 78 OFCOM, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS MARKET REPORT 2011, at 171 fig.5.1, 
304 fig.6.77 (2011). 
 79 Cisco Internet Bus. Solutions Grp., To Prevent 15% of Customers from Cord-Cutting, Fixed 
Broadband SPs Consider WiFi Solutions to Deliver the Mobility Customers Seek, CISCO (Oct. 
2011), http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/FastFacts/FastFacts_WiFi_Defense_against_BB 
_Cord_Cutting_Oct2011.pdf. 
 80 See Hal Singer, Wireless Competition Under the Senate’s Microscope, FORBES (June 4,  
2013, 10:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halsinger/2013/06/04/wireless-competition-under-the 
-senates-microscope. 
 81 HomeFusion Broadband From Verizon Now Available Nationwide on America’s Largest 4G 
LTE Network, VERIZON WIRELESS (May 2, 2012), http://news.verizonwireless.com/news/2012/05 
/pr2012-05-02.html. 
 82 See Chris McGovern et al., Smartphones as a Substitute: Why Some Smartphone Users 
Aren’t Subscribing at Home 5 (Sept. 13, 2013) (paper presented at the 41st Annual Telecommuni-
cations Policy Research Conference), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242689.  
 83 Kevin Fitchard, Why Is SK Telecom’s LTE Network “Advanced” While EE’s Is Not?,  
GIGAOM (July 3, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/2013/07/03/why-is-sk-telecoms-lte-network 
-advanced-while-ees-is-not. 
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speeds of 3 Gbps and upload speeds of 1.5 Gbps.84  South Korea’s 
leading wireless provider, SK Telecom, launched LTE Advanced in 
June 2013 and has successfully delivered data speeds of up to 150 
Mbps.85  Korean provider LG Uplus86 and Australian provider Telstra 
have followed suit, with the latter planning to provide service up to 
300 Mbps.87 
It is at least plausible that wireless broadband might serve as a 
long-term substitute for wireline broadband.  Such a development 
would undercut claims of a looming cable monopoly.  Once wireless 
broadband is included, the FCC’s June 2012 data indicate that 92% of 
U.S. households resided in census blocks where three or more provid-
ers offered service at or near the benchmarks established by the Na-
tional Broadband Plan.88  Moreover, 62% of U.S. households resided 
in census blocks where three or more providers offered 6 Mbps/1.5 
Mbps service, and 23% of households resided in census blocks where 
three or more providers offered 10 Mbps/1.5 Mbps service.89 
Moreover, as Figure 1 shows, these trends have been steadily im-
proving.  Given that LTE averages more than 10 Mbps, the competi-
tiveness in the higher tiers is likely to improve.  Indeed, once the major 
providers finish deploying LTE across their entire footprints, we  
can expect 97.2% of households to reside in census blocks in which 
three or more providers have deployed wireless broadband service that 
exceeds 10 Mbps, and 92.8% will have four such providers.90  The in-
clusion of wireless services also has the potential to substantially lessen 
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 84 See Jeanette Wannstrom, LTE-Advanced, 3GPP (May 2012), http://www.3gpp.org/lte 
-advanced. 
 85 Tammy Parker, SK Telecom: Take a Closer Look at Its LTE Advanced Rollout, FIERCE 
BROADBAND WIRELESS (July 11, 2013), http://www.fiercewireless.com/tech/special-reports/sk 
-telecom-take-closer-look-its-lte-advanced-rollout. 
 86 Lance Whitney, South Korea Launches Second LTE-Advanced Network, CNET (July 18, 
2013, 6:40 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57594325-94/south-korea-launches-second-lte 
-advanced-network. 
 87 See Kevin Fitchard, Asia’s Turbo-Charged LTE Networks Show What’s in Store for the U.S., 
Europe, GIGAOM (Aug. 12, 2013, 12:44 PM), http://gigaom.com/2013/08/12/asias-turbo-charged 
-lte-networks-show-whats-in-store-for-the-u-s-europe (reporting Telstra’s recent live network trial 
of LTE Advanced). 
 88 See JUNE 2012 INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES REPORT, supra note 51, at 10 fig.5(b).  In 
2010, the FCC updated its benchmark for broadband service to 4 Mbps downstream and 1 Mbps 
upstream.  Inquiry Considering the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to 
All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such De-
ployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the 
Broadband Improvement Act, Sixth Broadband Deployment Report, 25 FCC Rcd. 9556, 9563 
¶ 11 (2010).  The FCC used the closest speed tier available in the existing data, which was 3 
Mbps downstream and 768 kbps upstream.  Id. at 9569 ¶ 20. 
 89 JUNE 2012 INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES REPORT, supra note 51, at 10 fig.5(b). 
 90 See Sixteenth Annual Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 63, at 3747 tbl.5. 
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FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS LOCATED  
IN CENSUS BLOCKS WITH THREE OR MORE FIXED-LINE OR 
WIRELESS BROADBAND PROVIDERS AS OF JUNE 30, 201291  
 
the digital divide, lowering the number of unserved Americans from 
19 million (6%) as of June 2011 to 5.5 million (1.7%).92 
Once this expansion in access to wireless broadband service occurs, 
the competitive landscape could well look quite different.  Empirical 
studies have shown that “most of the increase in competition comes 
with the entry of the second and third firms.”93  This insight is reflect-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 91 Sources: Id.; INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET 
ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2011, at 10 fig.5(b) (2013), available at http:// 
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-318810A1.pdf; INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. 
DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 
2011, at 9 fig.3(b) (2012), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC 
-314630A1.pdf; INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET AC-
CESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 9 fig.3(b) (2011), available at http:// 
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-310261A1.pdf; INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. 
DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 
2010, at 8 fig.3(b) (2011), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC 
-305296A1.pdf; INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET AC-
CESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2009, at 8 fig.3(b) (2010), available at http:// 
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-303405A1.pdf. 
 92 Inquiry Considering the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All 
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deploy-
ment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broad-
band Data Improvement Act, Eighth Broadband Progress Report, 27 FCC Rcd. 10,342, 10,384 
tbl.15 (2012). 
 93 Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets, 
99 J. POL. ECON. 977, 1007 (1991). 
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ed in actual antitrust enforcement policy, which has increasingly per-
mitted four-to-three mergers.94  In addition, policymakers must bear in 
mind that regulation is neither perfect nor costless.  As a result, the de-
cision whether to intervene is inherently an exercise in the comparative 
second-best.  When the comparison is between unregulated and regu-
lated monopoly, the former performs so badly that the balance tips in 
favor of intervention.  By contrast, although an unregulated three-firm 
oligopoly does not perform as well as perfect competition, it may per-
form sufficiently well to tip the balance the other way.95  Moreover, 
even if wireless broadband is not a substitute for all applications, to 
the extent that it serves as an alternative platform for email and other, 
lower-bandwidth applications, it may still exert a degree of price disci-
pline on cable.  And for those households that currently do not have 
access to broadband at all, LTE may represent their best hope. 
Past examples provide some encouragement that wireless broad-
band is or may soon become a substitute for cable.  For example, al-
though initially regarded as a complementary technology, wireless te-
lephony is now a substitute for traditional wireline telephony.  The 
number of wireless telephone connections surpassed that of wireline 
connections in late 2004,96 and as of the end of 2012, 38% of U.S. 
households relied entirely on wireless technologies for voice communi-
cations, a number that is increasing steadily each year.97 
Admittedly, many broadband technologies, such as satellite broad-
band, developed more slowly than many anticipated.  Others, such as 
broadband over powerline, MDS, and WiMax, never fulfilled the 
promise that many envisioned.  In technology-related industries, how-
ever, people tend to overestimate what they can accomplish in the 
short run while underestimating their potential in the long run.98  As a 
result, there is reason to maintain an open mind and focus on each 
technology’s long-run potential for success. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 94 See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 61 & n.233 
(2005) (collecting sources). 
 95 See Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model for 
U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 84–99 (2007). 
 96 Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Essay, On the Regulation of Networks as Complex 
Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (2005). 
 97 See STEPHEN J. BLUMBERG & JULIAN V. LUKE, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, WIRELESS SUBSTITUTION: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NA-
TIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JULY–DECEMBER 2012, at 1 (2013), available at http:// 
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 98 See, e.g., J.C.R. LICKLIDER, LIBRARIES OF THE FUTURE 17 n.† (1965). 
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II.  THE VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
OF CONTENT AND DISTRIBUTION 
Crawford is also concerned that Comcast’s market power will be 
enhanced still further by its merger with NBC Universal.99  Before the 
merger, Comcast was almost exclusively a video distribution company 
that owned only a few minor cable networks that comprised roughly 
3% of the programming market revenues.100  NBC Universal was al-
most exclusively a programming company, whose only distribution as-
sets were a handful of broadcast television stations101 that Crawford 
acknowledges are a dying part of the industry (pp. 128–31). 
Because the merger involved companies that, for the most part,  
did not compete directly with one another, Crawford somewhat grudg-
ingly recognizes that it is properly regarded as a vertical merger (pp. 
106–08, 188).102  As such, section A locates the merger with respect  
to the primary theories about how vertical integration can harm com-
petition.  Section B analyzes the extent to which the merger would  
allow Comcast to attack the market for video programming and dis-
tribution.  Section C looks at other actors that are positioned to affect 
the level of competition. 
A.  Primer on Vertical Integration 
Conventional economic theory identifies two ways that a vertical 
merger can harm competition.103  First, a firm with a dominant posi-
tion in one market (often called the primary market) can attempt to 
use vertical integration to attack an adjacent market (often called the 
secondary market).104  In the context of the Comcast–NBC Universal  
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 99 One area where Crawford and I find common ground is our dismay over how regulatory 
authorities often use the merger clearance process to extract concessions that have nothing to do 
with the merger (pp. 209–10).  For my own views, see Christopher S. Yoo, Merger Review by the 
Federal Communications Commission: The Comcast–NBC Universal Merger, 43 REV. INDUS. 
ORG. (forthcoming 2014). 
 100 Consumers, Competition, and Consolidation in the Video and Broadband Market: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & 
Transp., 111th Cong. 89 (2010) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Christopher S. Yoo, Pro-
fessor of Law and Communication, and Founding Director, Center for Technology, Innovation, 
and Competition, University of Pennsylvania). 
 101 Id. 
 102 At other moments, Crawford signals some ambivalence about characterizing the merger as 
vertical.  For example, in the book’s introduction, she offers a subtle gibe by describing Comcast’s 
description of the merger as a vertical one as a “smooth response[]” that Comcast was willing to 
share with anyone willing to engage them on the substance of the deal (p. 7).  She later repeats 
Senator Al Franken’s belief that the merger was not as vertical as Comcast would have the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee believe (p. 87). 
 103 The discussion in this section draws heavily on Yoo, supra note 31, at 187–206. 
 104 Id. at 185. 
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merger, this would amount to the claim that Comcast was using its 
control over last-mile distribution to render the market for video pro-
gramming or Internet content less competitive.  Certain structural pre-
conditions must exist for this theory to have any coherence.  As an ini-
tial matter, Comcast must have a dominant position in distribution; 
otherwise it has nothing to use as leverage.105  In addition, the second-
ary market must be concentrated and protected by entry barriers; oth-
erwise any attempt to raise prices in the secondary market will simply 
cause others to turn to unintegrated capacity in the secondary market 
or will stimulate entry sufficient to dissipate any advantages that the 
vertically integrated firm may temporarily enjoy.106  The competitive-
ness and the ease of entry into the markets for both video program-
ming and Internet content meant that this theory did not play a signif-
icant role in the analysis of the merger conducted by the Justice 
Department or by the FCC. 
Second, a firm can attempt to use vertical integration into a sec-
ondary market to maintain and protect its dominant position in its 
primary market.107  This theory suggests that Comcast’s goal was to 
protect its position in the market for video distribution.  Tying up key 
programming properties will force firms who wish to compete with 
Comcast in video distribution to produce their own sources of pro-
gramming.  Similar structural preconditions apply.  Forcing a firm to 
find alternative sources of programming is unproblematic, however, 
when unintegrated sources of supply exist or if entry into video pro-
gramming is easy.108 
Third, it is widely recognized that vertical integration can create 
substantial efficiencies.109  The existence of these efficiencies means 
that vertical integration may benefit consumers even when the market 
is structured in a way that makes anticompetitive effects plausible.110  
This is why vertical mergers have long been recognized as being less 
likely to create competitive problems than horizontal mergers.111 
The net result is that the economic impact of vertical integration is 
ambiguous as a theoretical matter and cannot be determined a priori.  
Whether the law should adopt an accommodating or skeptical stance 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 105 Id. at 188. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 186, 191. 
 108 1984 Merger Guidelines §§ 4.211–.212, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,835–36 (June 29, 1984), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.htm; see also 1992 Horizontal Merg-
er Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,552 (Sept. 10, 1992) (reaffirming section 4 of the 1984 Merg-
er Guidelines governing nonhorizontal mergers). 
 109 See, e.g., 1984 Merger Guidelines § 4.24, 49 Fed. Reg. at 26,837; Yoo, supra note 31, at 192–98. 
 110 See, e.g., Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 
335, 354–55 (1988). 
 111 1984 Merger Guidelines § 4.0, 49 Fed. Reg. at 26,834. 
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toward vertical mergers is thus an empirical question.  A recent survey 
of the empirical literature on vertical integration across a wide range 
of industries concluded that “under most circumstances, profit-
maximizing vertical-integration decisions are efficient, not just from 
firms’ but also from the consumers’ points of view.”112  It also found 
“clear evidence that restrictions on vertical integration that are im-
posed . . . on owners of retail networks are usually detrimental to con-
sumers.”113  It thus called on “government agencies to reconsider the 
validity of such restrictions.”114 
The empirical studies on the cable industry in particular support 
the same conclusion.115  Most find vertical integration to be welfare 
enhancing116 or ambiguous.117  Only one study found consumer harm, 
and in that case the size of the welfare loss was so miniscule ($0.60 per 
subscriber per year)118 that it was not worth government intervention. 
Moreover, the data collected by the FCC belie claims that vertical 
integration is a growing problem.  The FCC data from 1990 and 2006 
demonstrate a clear and dramatic reduction in the level of vertical in-
tegration in the industry. 
The data from 2012 are harder to interpret, because for internal po-
litical reasons the FCC did not issue a report covering 2007 to 2011,  
and when it resumed reporting data, it did so using a different format.  
As an initial matter, the FCC stopped reporting how many of the top 
cable networks by subscribership and prime time viewership were ver-
tically integrated with a cable or satellite provider, so other sources had 
to be used to identify those networks.119  More importantly, whereas all 
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 112 Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Ev-
idence, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 629, 680 (2007). 
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OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 145, 169 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008) (“A general presumption that 
vertical integration is pro-competitive is warranted by a substantial economics literature identify-
ing efficiency benefits of vertical integration, including empirical studies demonstrating positive 
effects of vertical integration in various industries.”). 
 115 For a review, see Yoo, supra note 31, at 238–41. 
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 119 Compare Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of 
Video Programming, Thirteenth Annual Report, 24 FCC Rcd. 542, 737–38 tbls.C-5 & C-6 (2009) 
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FIGURE 2: VERTICAL INTEGRATION  
IN THE CABLE INDUSTRY, 1990–2012120 
 
previous reports distinguished among cable networks that were (1) af-
filiated with a cable operator, (2) affiliated with another media compa-
ny, or (3) independent,121 the 2012 report apparently includes infor-
mation only on the first two categories.122  As a result, the 2012 report 
leaves out independent networks, including such important program-
ming sources as BBC America, Bloomberg Television, the NFL Net-
work, the Outdoor Channel, and the Tennis Channel.  By way of com-
parison, 357 (63%) of the 549 networks listed in the report in 2009 
were neither affiliated with a cable operator nor another media com-
pany,123 which suggests that the 2012 report both undercounts the total 
number of networks and overstates the degree of vertical integration.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
[hereinafter 2009 Video Competition Report], with 2012 Video Competition Report, supra note 120 
(omitting these tables). 
 120 Sources: Senate Hearing, supra note 100, at 93 fig.9; Annual Assessment of the Status of 
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Fourteenth Report, 27 FCC 
Rcd. 8610, app. B at 8796–801 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Video Competition Report] (reporting 
number of vertically integrated programming services); SNL KAGAN, ECONOMICS OF BASIC 
CABLE NETWORKS 46 (2012); TV Network Summary, SNL INTERACTIVE, http://www.snl.com 
/interactivex/tv_NetworksSummary.aspx (three chosen variables: (1) Network Type: Basic Cable; 
(2) Financial Item: Subscribers (M); (3) Year: 2009–2016) (last visited June 21, 2013). 
 121 See, e.g., 2009 Video Competition Report, supra note 119, at 690–710 tbls.C-1 & C-2 (2009). 
 122 See 2012 Video Competition Report, supra note 120, app. B at 8796–801 tbl.B-1. 
 123 See 2009 Video Competition Report, supra note 119, at 695–710 tbl.C-2. 
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A review of other sources suggests that the undercounting is signifi-
cant.124  If the number of unaffiliated networks is estimated to be in 
the same proportion as in 2006, the degree of vertical integration drops 
to 16%, more or less in line with the previous data. 
The tendency of vertical integration to benefit consumers makes it 
appropriate to place the burden on those opposing the merger to 
demonstrate consumer harm.125  At a minimum, the models require a 
number of structural preconditions that must be satisfied before it 
seems likely that consumers may be harmed.126 
The empirical data on vertical integration raise doubts as to 
whether the Comcast–NBC Universal merger is likely to harm con-
sumers.  Such claims become even less tenable after one examines the 
specific mechanisms that the book suggests the merged company 
would use to harm OVDs and the steps that Netflix is taking to assert 
its own bargaining power. 
B.  An Evaluation of the Merger 
Crawford argues that the merger of Comcast and NBC Universal 
will enable the company to favor its own video platform by withhold-
ing content from Netflix and other OVDs or by charging OVDs more 
to deliver their content.  Although Comcast was increasingly shifting 
focus away from video distribution and toward high-speed Internet 
access (pp. 66, 112, 172–73),127 Crawford argues that Comcast still 
sought to slow down the growth of OVDs until it could transition its 
customers to its own Internet-based video distribution platform (pp. 
103–04, 113, 117–19, 165, 173, 228). 
This argument is complicated somewhat by the fact that Comcast–
NBC Universal holds ownership stakes in two different OVDs.  The 
first is Xfinity Streampix, which is Comcast’s version of the TV Ev-
erywhere verification system created by the cable companies to au-
thenticate that Internet Protocol television viewers are paying cable 
subscribers.  The second is Hulu, the joint venture that NBC Univer-
sal helped launch. 
At this writing, neither Xfinity nor Hulu seems like much of a 
threat to Netflix.  Notwithstanding the existence of statements praising 
the product (p. 166), Comcast chairman and CEO Brian Roberts ad-
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 124 A review of SNL Kagan reveals that the FCC report does not list 68 (34%) of the 198 net-
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 125 2009 Video Competition Report, supra note 119, at 661–62. 
 126 Yoo, supra note 31, at 200–04. 
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Not Include TV, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2013, at B1. 
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mits that Xfinity has made a number of missteps.128  Hulu is also 
struggling.  After initially relying exclusively on advertising since its 
launch in 2007, it added a subscription service called Hulu Plus in 
2010, which is currently priced at $7.99 per month.  During 2012, Hulu 
garnered $695 million in revenue (an increase of 65%), reached 3 mil-
lion subscribers (an annual 100% increase), and spent $500 million to 
acquire content.129  The venture remained unprofitable, however.  Alt-
hough the company does not report earnings, a recent disclosure in 
Disney’s financial statements indicated that it is losing as much as $30 
million per quarter.130  The saving grace is that Hulu has become an 
acquisition target, with the bidders including AT&T, Yahoo!, DirecTV, 
and Time Warner Cable, among others.131 
While impressive, these numbers pale in comparison to those of 
Netflix, which captured $3.6 billion in revenue132 and roughly 30 mil-
lion subscribers as of September 2013,133 and committed to spending 
$2 billion on content in the year beginning in September 2012 with an 
additional $3.5 billion in future commitments.134  Netflix’s growth con-
tinued in the first quarter of 2013, reaching $1 billion in quarterly rev-
enue for the first time.135  Its market capitalization is roughly $12 bil-
lion, fifteen to twenty times larger than the reported purchase price of 
Hulu.  It is easy to see why Crawford was pessimistic about Netflix’s 
fate in 2012 after the Comcast–NBC Universal merger.  Netflix’s mar-
ket capitalization reached a high of $15.7 billion in July 2011 only to 
drop into the $3 billion range in November 2011, before recovering in 
January 2013 and reaching nearly $20 billion in November 2013.136  
The development of its Open Connect CDN and its sponsorship of 
original programming are potential game changers.  As Crawford rec-
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 128 Alex Ben Block, Comcast’s Brian Roberts Talks TV Everywhere, New Entertainment System 
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visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
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ognizes, Netflix deserves its reputation for being innovative and nim-
ble (p. 115). 
Moreover, it is hard to see how Comcast–NBC Universal could use 
its control over content to harm competition.  To do so would require 
the merged company to have a dominant position in content and the 
market to be protected by entry barriers.137  Although cable networks 
such as USA Network and SyFy offer excellent programming, there is 
no reason they cannot be replicated.  For most types of programming, 
NBC Universal is simply one of several movie studios creating long-
form video content, and beyond the existing studios, creative talent 
and the physical equipment necessary to create original programming 
exist in sufficient amounts to ensure that content will always be avail-
able.138  Indeed, Netflix is developing its own original programming, 
led by the political drama House of Cards and later followed by new 
episodes of Arrested Development.139  Hulu and Amazon are following 
Netflix’s lead and creating original programming of their own.140 
Investors’ optimism about Netflix is captured by its price-to-
earnings (P/E) ratio, which reflects the expected growth rates for each 
company.  Even before 2013, during Netflix’s recent doldrums, its P/E 
ratio was around 100; the recent recovery of its price has caused it to 
spike to a high of over 600 in February–March of 2013.141  Comcast’s 
P/E ratio during the same period ranged roughly from 17 to 18.142 
It is thus unlikely that withholding conventional programming 
could serve as a basis for anticompetitive behavior.  However, there is 
one type of programming that would be difficult to replicate: live 
sports, which Crawford characterizes as a programming battering ram 
(p. 141).  In apparent recognition of its unique nature, she devotes an 
entire chapter to sports programming. 
Crawford is correct that sports are unlike other programming 
properties, in that video distributors are not free to develop their own 
sources of supply.143  Although Crawford portrays NBC’s sports hold-
ings as extensive (pp. 144–47), on closer inspection it becomes clear 
that NBC Universal is far from a dominant player in television sports.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 137 Yoo, supra note 31, at 230. 
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Its expenditures on the four major sports leagues lag far behind Disney 
and News Corp.’s expenditures.  And even though Crawford is correct 
that the fan base to whom NBC Universal televises NHL hockey is 
quite loyal (p. 148), the licensing fees for hockey amount to a pittance 
at $40 million.144  Finally, while NBC Universal did commit to pay 
$4.4 billion to televise the Olympics over a twenty-year span, this only 
amounts to $220 million per year, which is too small to change NBC 
Universal’s position in the rankings.145 
FIGURE 3: ANNUAL COMMITMENTS  
TO MAJOR SPORTS LEAGUES ($ MILLIONS)146 
OWNER COMMITMENT
Disney (ABC, ESPN) $1849
News Corp. (Fox) $1142
Comcast–NBC $690
CBS $623
Time Warner (TBS, TNT) $438
 
When it comes to sports programming, it is far from clear that 
Comcast holds the upper hand.  While Crawford suggests that other 
companies have little choice but to deal with Comcast on its terms (p. 
68), she recognizes that sports properties such as ESPN possess the 
clout to reverse the tables (p. 119).  Recent attempts by sports leagues 
to set up their own cable channels have altered industry dynamics still 
further.  Nonetheless, Crawford insists on interpreting Comcast’s 
sports deals in a way that raises alarm.  When Comcast paid too little, 
it was a reflection of Comcast’s market dominance (p. 147).  When 
Comcast paid too much, Crawford interpreted it as a foreclosure pre-
mium (pp. 147–48).  An equally likely interpretation is that the dis-
putes simply represent hard, arms-length bargaining and good faith 
disagreements over the relative value of the property. 
Even if Comcast does not deny OVDs access to its content,  
Crawford warns that Comcast can use usage-based billing and band-
width caps to make OVD-delivered video more expensive and to dis-
courage its customers from relying on OVDs as their primary source of 
video programming (pp. 175–82).  In addition, Crawford warns that 
Comcast might charge Netflix exorbitant amounts to terminate its traf-
fic (pp. 182–85). 
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Crawford is correct that monthly bandwidth caps represent an im-
perfect way to measure the impact that a person’s traffic will have on 
the network.  The real issue is how much traffic a person generates 
during peak periods (p. 176).  Thus, a person who consumes a great 
deal of bandwidth may have no impact on other users if she makes 
sure to do it when the network is not congested, in which case monthly 
usage would overstate that person’s impact on congestion.  Conversely, 
a person who produces small amounts of traffic during peak periods 
may be the source of congestion even though the total amount of 
bandwidth he or she transmits is minimal.147  The existence of compet-
itive options would limit Comcast’s ability to harm OVDs.  And al-
though usage caps that are not tied to peak usage are imperfect ways 
to meter consumption, the problem of network congestion is quite real. 
In any event, claims that Comcast will exert bargaining power over 
Netflix have failed to materialize.  Instead, it is Netflix that seems to 
have the upper hand over network providers.  Netflix is asking broad-
band Internet access providers either to terminate its traffic on a set-
tlement-free basis (through a practice called “peering”) or to accept 
traffic from its new, proprietary content-delivery network, Open Con-
nect.  In either case, rather than paying networks to deliver video traf-
fic to individual end users, as Netflix used to do, Netflix is now asking 
for (and often receiving) that service for free, with Netflix only offering 
HD and 3D content if the ISP agrees.148  The insistence on peering is 
made all the more curious by the fact that networks typically peer only 
when volumes are symmetrical.149  In the case of Netflix, the traffic is 
likely to be radically asymmetrical, with Netflix generating up to one-
third of all of the traffic flowing through the Internet during peak 
times.  Yet it has nonetheless been able to induce a large number of 
ISPs around the world to accept Open Connect.  Instead of Netflix be-
ing held hostage by the cable companies, it is the cable companies who 
complain that they are being held hostage by Netflix.150  Crawford’s 
advice that Netflix avoid controversy until the day comes when the 
cable operators need Netflix more than Netflix needs them (p. 120) 
thus appears to have become relevant sooner than she expected.  
Crawford closes her chapter on “The Biggest Squeeze of All” by ask-
ing, “How is Netflix doing today?” (p. 187).  The answer appears to be, 
“Fine, thank you.”  That said, although this answer seems relatively 
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clear now, it was not so obvious just a few short months ago.  My 
point is not to use hindsight to criticize a prediction that ended up not 
panning out.  The fact that Netflix’s share price tumbled once suggests 
that it could happen again.  Instead, my aim is to underscore the im-
portance of being humble about our ability to foresee the future and to 
highlight the dangers of basing prescriptive regulatory policies on too 
strong a preconception of the future. 
Predicting the future is hard.  As the FCC noted in its most recent 
video competition report, OVD business and revenue models are still 
in a state of flux.151  Indeed, the battle for streaming video is just heat-
ing up, with Verizon entering into a joint venture with Redbox and 
YouTube to implement Content ID to facilitate professional content, 
and services such as Facebook, Mubi, Fandor, Amazon’s Video on 
Demand, and Sony’s Crackle pursuing new business models.152  More-
over, ESPN recently offered to pay wireless ISPs an additional premi-
um if their bandwidth would not count against user bandwidth 
caps.153  In an industry undergoing such dynamic change, regulators 
should think long and hard before intervening prophylactically to pro-
tect against some anticipated state of the world that may or may not 
come to pass. 
Crawford’s assertion that combining Comcast’s cable networks 
with NBC Universal’s programming content will harm consumers 
thus depends on a series of propositions that all must prove true if the 
scenario she predicts is to unfold.  Cable must hold a monopoly over 
transmission.  NBC Universal must control essential programming 
without which other firms cannot compete.  Moreover, the argument 
must overcome the large body of empirical evidence showing that ver-
tical integration is unlikely to harm consumers as well as the fact that 
Netflix seems to be gaining the upper hand in this particular struggle. 
In essence, Crawford’s primary argument is that AOL’s strategy of 
combining content and conduit was ahead of its time (pp. 102–04) and 
that Comcast will succeed where AOL failed (pp. 105, 109, 167).  His-
tory provides ample reason to be skeptical of this claim.  The bank-
ruptcy of Excite@Home and the recent divestitures of DirecTV and 
Time Warner Cable make it as (if not more) likely that AOL’s attempt 
to combine content and conduit was simply a bad idea.  If so, that epi-
sode stands as a shining example of the benefits of not intervening and 
instead allowing companies to experiment with different business 
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strategies.154  Although this history suggests that the Comcast–NBC 
Universal merger may ultimately fare no better than those previous ef-
forts, it is not the province of regulators to protect corporate officers 
and shareholders from making mistakes, if for no other reason than 
that it is so difficult to recognize one in advance. 
C.  Nonbarking Dogs 
Another strange aspect of the concerns Crawford raises regarding 
the merger is that she implicitly treats the struggle between cable com-
panies and OVDs as the central issue in broadband policy.  As such, the 
companies usually identified as the leaders of the Internet industry — 
Google, Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook, and Intel — receive just 
a passing mention and play only a tangential role in the analysis. 
The omission is striking.  As of October 18, 2013, Apple, Google, 
and Microsoft are three of the four biggest companies in the world in 
terms of market capitalization.155  In fact, both Apple and Google each 
have market valuations that are three times larger than Comcast’s and 
that exceed the size of the entire cable industry combined.  Moreover, 
Apple and Google (soon to be joined by Intel) both have ongoing set-
top box initiatives, and Amazon, Facebook, and Google’s YouTube 
have begun to enter into long-form video distribution. 
The addition of these other firms changes the calculus dramatically.  
Crawford acknowledges that Apple has the clout to keep ISPs in 
check; indeed, she characterizes the current balance of power as a 
“standoff of sorts” (p. 163).  Moreover, she concedes that the major ac-
tors (which include Apple, Google, and Microsoft, as well as AT&T, 
Verizon, Comcast, and Time Warner Cable) have reached a state of 
“equipoise” in which each firm is too big for any of the others to ab-
sorb or crush (p. 168).  The logical implication is that major regulatory 
intervention is harder to justify. 
Additionally, broadening the vision to include more of the value 
chain reveals a deep tension about where the monopoly problem really 
lies.  In the context of the network neutrality debate, it is the network.  
In the context of the cable program access rules, it is video content.  In 
the context of the FTC’s investigation of Google, it is the search en-
gine.  In calls for opening up Apple’s App Store, it is the smartphone.  
Without the discipline of requiring complainants to articulate a specif-
ic theory of harm, these arguments become plastic, transforming to fit 
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the politics of the moment.  Indeed, if market power exists in more 
than one level (such as in both content and conduit as Crawford con-
tends (pp. 88, 216)), consumers may benefit more if the merger is per-
mitted to proceed.156 
III.  UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
OF REGULATORY INTERVENTION 
Another facet of regulatory interventions that is often overlooked is 
that they rarely create stable equilibria.  Instead, much as squeezing a 
balloon on one end causes it to expand in some other place, every gov-
ernmental mandate creates a series of secondary and tertiary conse-
quences that must be explored. 
A.  Impact on Investment Incentives 
One of Crawford’s core recommendations is that the government 
should place restrictions on the prices that network providers can 
charge (pp. 261, 265).  There is an extent to which this recommenda-
tion is working at cross purposes with itself.  Using regulation to re-
duce the profitability of an oligopoly can have the perverse impact of 
locking the oligopoly into place.  The problem is well illustrated by the 
FCC’s financing and syndication (finsyn) rules, which Crawford ad-
mires (pp. 129–31).  Finsyn was designed to restrict the profitability of 
the big three networks — ABC, CBS, and NBC — by limiting their 
ability to hold the syndication rights in the programs that they tele-
vised.  Unfortunately, finsyn also reduced the profitability of potential 
entrants, which made the emergence of a competitor that would fur-
ther diversify the market less likely.157  It is thus no accident that the 
Fox Network needed to ask for a finsyn waiver before it could enter.158  
Even though breaking up the broadcast triopoly had long been one of 
the FCC’s policy goals, the rules it established to limit the triopoly’s 
market power ran the risk of helping cement the triopoly into place. 
Finsyn had another unanticipated consequence.  The rules were al-
so supposed to limit the networks’ ability to pressure independent pro-
gram producers into giving up their syndication rights.  Unfortunately, 
the rules had the perverse effect of hurting independent program pro-
ducers by reducing the value of programming to the networks and 
thus the amount the networks were willing to pay for it.159  In the pro-
cess, the independent program producers were forced to assume the 
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long-term risk associated with these programs even though the net-
works’ larger size and greater diversification placed them in a better 
position to bear it.160 
The finsyn experience teaches that mandating access and regulat-
ing the price of access to a monopoly facility must be undertaken with 
considerable care.  A vertical chain of production is efficient only if 
each link is competitive.  The primary policy goal should be identify-
ing those links that are the most concentrated and protected by entry 
barriers and promoting competition within them.  In the case of the 
Internet, that link exists where the provider provides connectivity from 
an interconnection point in the city to individual residences, often 
called “the last mile.”  Only if entry into the last mile is impossible 
does it make sense to pursue secondary goals, such as promoting com-
petition and innovation in other links in the chain.  The problem is 
that once entry into the last mile becomes feasible, regulators must 
make sure to stop mandating access to the network and to stop regu-
lating rates.  The short-run increase in prices provides both the signal 
to other actors that the market is in disequilibrium and the incentive 
for potential entrants to start making investments in alternative or ad-
ditional capacity.  Continuing to mandate access would only serve to 
entrench the monopoly by undermining incentives to invest and de-
priving would-be entrants of their natural strategic partners. 
Indeed, this is the lesson emerging from the European approach, 
which regulates rates and requires network owners to share their facil-
ities with competitors.  Although European Internet users have en-
joyed low prices that have in turn caused adoption rates to increase, 
forcing providers to extend below-cost access to some customers has 
forestalled investments in FTTH and other next-generation net-
works.161  Attempts to use mandated access as stepping stones toward 
full facilities-based competition have proven unsuccessful.162  The ro-
bust U.S. investments in fiber, advanced generations of DSL, and LTE 
suggest that entry is indeed feasible.  Even if entry were not yet feasi-
ble, one would need to have faith that regulators would have the abil-
ity to lift regulation swiftly as soon as those circumstances changed. 
There is another fundamental irony underlying proposals to man-
date access to last-mile broadband facilities.  One reason that Crawford 
favors such proposals is that the Internet generates benefits to others (p. 
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17).163  This argument taps into the analysis of externalities associated 
with economist A.C. Pigou and extended by Ronald Coase.  Externali-
ties come in two forms.  Conduct that generates positive externalities 
creates benefits that accrue to other people, such as occurs when a per-
son makes home improvements that increase the value of adjacent 
houses.  Conduct that generates negative externalities imposes costs on 
other people, such as occurs when a factory produces smoke that lessens 
neighbors’ enjoyment of their land. 
The problem is that individuals deciding whether to undertake a 
particular activity consider only their private costs and benefits with-
out taking into account the impact on others.  For example, homeown-
ers considering whether to improve their homes would compare the 
cost of doing so with the increase in the value of their houses while ig-
noring any increase in the value of nearby houses.  The fact that they 
would not take into account the full social value of the improvement 
means that they will sometimes fail to make an improvement even 
when the net social value of doing so exceeds the cost. 
The conventional wisdom offers two potential solutions to this 
problem.  First, the government can induce more of those positive ex-
ternality–generating activities through direct subsidies.164  But needless 
to say, the debates in Washington, D.C., are currently focusing on how 
to reduce, not increase, government spending.  Even worse, instead of 
providing a subsidy, Crawford’s proposal to mandate access is better 
understood as a form of taxation by regulation that would have pre-
cisely the opposite effect.165 
Second, the wedge between private and social benefit can be re-
duced if firms are permitted to capture more of the positive externali-
ties they generate for others.  One logical way to accomplish this is by 
permitting them to vertically integrate into those complementary activ-
ities that benefit from those positive externalities.166  For example, In-
ternet connectivity creates benefits for consumers by stimulating inno-
vative content and applications.  The fact that the network provider 
does not capture any of those benefits can lead to systematic under-
investment.  A straightforward solution would be to allow the network 
provider to internalize some of the value created by these new forms of 
content and applications.  Unfortunately, the separation of content and 
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conduit and the remedy of mandatory access that Crawford proposes 
would effectively preclude this solution. 
B.  Transfer of Value from the Network’s Core to Its Edge 
Another benefit of the Internet’s architecture is to allow different 
aspects of the network to act independently.  The networks simply 
pass along data without knowing anything about the nature of the 
communications they are carrying.  Conversely, so long as content and 
application providers present their data in accordance with the Inter-
net protocol, they do not need to know anything about the nature of 
the networks over which their traffic is passing. 
This independence yields a number of advantages.  Insulating each 
component from the details of the other components promotes flexibil-
ity, improves fault localization, and makes it easier to make changes to 
components without causing ripples throughout the entire system.167  
Cabining the way components interact with one another radically sim-
plifies the testing that must be conducted.168  It also speeds innovation 
by allowing parallel testing of multiple solutions.169 
At the same time, this architecture carries with it a number of po-
tential drawbacks.  Though the architecture creates value by encour-
aging parallel experimentation with new solutions, it also shifts the 
value gained from those experiments from the center of the network to 
the components where the experiments are taking place.170  Not only 
does this deprive the last broadband providers of the revenue needed 
to support the build-out of next-generation networks, it creates a po-
tential perverse incentive for service providers.  Each of the comple-
mentary service providers has the ability and incentive to maximize its 
own interests and optimize locally.171  The problem is that individual 
optimization decisions may not produce outcomes that maximize glob-
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al value.172  In addition, no actor is in a natural position to exercise 
leadership over the platform.173 
C.  The Potential Benefits of Nonuniformity 
Finally, Crawford’s vision of a world in which all networks are 
mandated to be open ignores the fact that end users may derive signif-
icant benefits from alternative architectures.  If everyone wants the 
same thing from the network, the optimal course is to offer a single 
network designed to satisfy what end users demand.  The engineering 
community has long recognized, however, that the current architecture 
is ill suited to support key features such as security, mobility, mass me-
dia distribution, quality of service, and multihoming.174  As the de-
mand for these services increases, the natural course is for network 
providers to diversify their offerings to meet the growing heterogeneity 
of consumer demand. 
Allowing firms to pursue different strategies can yield real benefits.  
For example, Apple has always insisted on a relatively closed architec-
ture to help ensure that end users’ experiences remain positive.175  As a 
simple matter of business strategy, one would expect Google’s Android 
platform to avoid becoming simply a me-too offering by allowing a more 
open architecture.  Permitting heterogeneity also allows consumers to 
receive the benefits from both approaches, while at the same time en-
joying the manner in which the presence of an open platform can serve 
as a safety valve against any abuses attempted by a closed platform. 
Conversely, mandating access to the network could have an ad-
verse effect on innovation.  Requiring the network to accept any 
properly configured data at a particular location effectively locks that 
interface into place.176  This requirement can inhibit the network’s 
ability to respond to technological changes that would otherwise push 
it toward a different architecture.177 
The fact that end users, applications, technologies, and business re-
lationships on the Internet are becoming more heterogeneous suggests 
that the natural response is for the network to become more diverse as 
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well.178  Therefore, positing regulatory policy as a choice between open 
and closed architectures may represent a false dichotomy.  End users 
may be best off with a mixture of both.  Not only can the availability 
of different solutions deliver greater value, but divided technical lead-
ership can also represent an important form of rivalry,179 and experi-
mentation with new standards may properly be regarded not as patho-
logical, but rather as a sign of innovative health.180 
IV.  ASSESSING THE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Crawford’s concluding chapter offers a series of policy recommen-
dations.  Specifically, she calls on the government to support broadscale 
deployment of municipal FTTH and to mandate the separation of con-
tent and conduit.  These recommendations, however, each include some 
fundamental internal tensions that the book does not fully address. 
A.  Subsidize Fiber-to-the-Home 
One of Crawford’s core recommendations is that the government 
subsidize gigabit symmetric FTTH owned and operated by municipal-
ities (pp. 263–65).  Capable of delivering download speeds of up to 
100,000 Gbps,181 FTTH possesses sufficient bandwidth to compete 
with cable.182  While FTTH has continued to grow, covering approxi-
mately 15% of U.S. households in December 2010,183 17% of U.S. 
households in December 2011,184 and 23% of U.S. households in De-
cember 2012,185 Verizon (the leading provider of FTTH) has stopped 
expanding its FiOS footprint (pp. 3, 78, 80, 113, 225, 236). 
As Crawford recognizes at other points, the primary deterrent to the 
rollout of fiber is its prohibitive cost (pp. 78–79, 161, 236).  A recent 
published estimate suggests that it costs Verizon FiOS $700 per home 
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to lay the fiber on the utility poles and conduits that pass each home 
and an additional $650 per household to connect individual houses to 
that fiber and to install the fiber modem in the house.186  If every house 
where FiOS is available purchased the service, it would cost only $1350 
per household.  But if penetration rates are only fifty percent, Verizon 
would have to recover twice the cost per home passed from each sub-
scriber ($1400).  When combined with the $650 installation cost, the to-
tal cost would be $2050 per household.  Since actual adoption rates 
were 37.3% at the end of 2012,187 FiOS costs $2500 per subscriber 
without including operating, marketing, and service costs.  Costs per 
home passed for Google Fiber in Kansas City are likely to be similar,188 
and costs for broadscale deployment in Japan are somewhat higher.189 
Based on these numbers, the cost to offer 100 Mbps service to 100 
million households would be roughly $250 billion.  Given that Verizon 
FiOS and Google Fiber are currently deploying in areas of fairly high 
density, these numbers suggest that the estimate listed in the National 
Broadband Plan of $350 billion to provide 100 Mbps service to 100 
million homes may well be realistic, despite Crawford’s skepticism (p. 
267).  The cost to extend fiber to those areas that are not currently 
served by broadband is likely to be much higher. 
There is thus reason to question whether FTTH would be a good 
use of limited public resources.  And even if it were a foregone conclu-
sion that the entire country would need FTTH, timing matters.  When 
Verizon announced its plans to build FiOS, the capital markets re-
garded the venture as too risky.  Consequently, the bond rating agen-
cies lowered Verizon’s bond rating and Wall Street slashed its stock 
price, thereby raising the cost of both debt and equity capital on all of 
the company’s future projects.  It is as if Verizon had borrowed the 
money and immediately begun to pay interest on it.  As the National 
Broadband Plan noted, whether that ultimately proves to be a good 
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investment depends on how quickly the demand for higher bandwidth 
services develops.190  In other words, there is substantial benefit to 
making sure that investments coincide with demand. 
Moreover, there is good reason to question whether government 
ownership is likely to represent the best institutional form for running 
fiber.  As an initial matter, the empirical literature on government 
ownership is not encouraging.  A recent survey of fifty-two studies 
comparing publicly and privately owned firms found that only five of 
the studies concluded that publicly owned firms perform better than 
privately owned firms.191  Of the remaining studies, thirty-two found 
private ownership to be superior, and the results of fifteen were ambig-
uous or not statistically significant.192 
To the extent that government ownership has succeeded, it has 
done so in industries such as water or electric power, in which the 
transmission technologies are stable and the fact that entry was unlike-
ly obviates concerns about investment incentives.193  Conversely, the 
experience with the government’s takeover of the telephone system 
during World War I reveals that government ownership does poorly 
when the underlying technology is undergoing a period of dynamic 
change and when the infrastructure needs significant capital invest-
ments.  In such cases, governments often struggle to make the best 
technology choices and must finance investments through tax revenues 
or bond issues rather than risk capital.194 
More recent history is no more comforting.  The collapse of munic-
ipal WiFi has generated a wide array of postmortem analyses trying to 
figure out what went wrong.195  The burgeoning municipal fiber 
movement appears to be more hype than substance.  The available da-
ta suggest that municipal fiber deployments face significantly higher 
costs compared to private deployments in terms of both cost per home 
passed and cost per subscriber.196  As of August 2012, Chattanooga’s 
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much ballyhooed fiber deployment had garnered a grand total of elev-
en customers for its maximum data rate plan.197 
B.  Bring Back Common Carriage 
Crawford’s other core recommendation is to return to the regime in 
which transport was separated from content (pp. 37–38, 45, 264–65).  
She repeatedly laments the death of common carriage, which histori-
cally has mandated nondiscrimination and the regulation of rates (pp. 
36, 53–56, 61–62, 94, 121, 160, 162, 186–87, 230, 270). 
In so doing, she hearkens back to a longstanding regulatory regime 
without taking into account the substantial literature exploring its limi-
tations and shortcomings.  As I discuss in greater detail elsewhere, as an 
initial matter, common carriage works best when the product is a com-
modity that does not vary in terms of quality, firms employ uniform 
production technologies, and market share is relatively stable.198  It is ill 
suited to circumstances in which the quality of service varies along mul-
tiple dimensions, production technologies are heterogeneous, and busi-
ness volumes change rapidly.199  In addition, a substantial literature ex-
ists cataloging how the traditional tools of common carriage regulation 
reward inefficiency, deter innovation, and facilitate collusion.200 
Crawford acknowledges that common carriage has historically been 
hard to enforce (p. 32) and that behavioral remedies do not work par-
ticularly well (p. 63).  Yet she calls for a return to common carriage 
without grappling with how to address the recognized shortcomings in 
the regime. 
CONCLUSION 
At the end of the day, we are left with the question of what to 
make of Crawford’s concerns.  Certainly, it is possible that cable may 
end up being the only broadband platform capable of delivering video 
and that the combination of content and conduit allows it to forestall 
the development of OVDs like Netflix. 
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But an examination of the current state of the industry and humili-
ty about anyone’s ability to predict the future provide reasons to be 
open minded as to whether competition and scientific progress might 
lead to a better outcome.  The emergence of new technologies has 
eliminated the market inefficiencies that for decades had been the fo-
cus of federal policy: the monopolies over voice telephony and multi-
channel video distribution and the triopoly over television program-
ming.  At the same time, network providers are investing billions of 
dollars into alternative network capacity.201  Beyond that, the Internet 
has provided a host of new services that have revolutionized the way 
people interact with each other and obtain information. 
In short, I look at the same reality as Professor Crawford and see 
reason for optimism, not pessimism.  I believe the technological solu-
tions are reasonably promising and the literature finding that vertical 
integration generally enhances welfare is sufficiently robust to justify 
tolerating new business practices until real-world data show them to 
be harmful.  Acting preemptively overestimates our ability to foresee 
the future and risks depriving potential innovations of the breathing 
room they need to emerge. 
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